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Abstract
As part the  Local  Lcvel  Institutions  study of local  life in  government  organizations tends to increase their own
villages  in rural  Indonesia  informationi  was gathered  on  reports  of positive  voice,  participation,  and information.
sampled  household's  participation  in  social activities.  We  In contrast,  the data suggest a negative  spillover on other
classified  the reported  activities  into four distinct types  of  houselholds.  There is a strong "chilling"  effect of one
social  activity:  sociability, nietworks, social organtizations,  houselhold's  participation  in village  government
and village governmiientt organizations.  Respondenits  were  organizations  on  the voice,  participation,  and
also asked about questions about their village  information of other  households  in the same village.  The
government:  whether  they were iniformed about village  net effect of engagement  in village  government
funds and projects,  if they participated  in village  organizations  is generally  negative,  while the net effect of
decisions,  if they  expressed  voice about village  problems,  membership  in social  organizations is more  often
and  if they  thought the village  government was  associated  with good  governance outcomes.  These
responisive to local  problems.  Several  findings emerge  findings indicate  that existing social  organizations  have a
regarding the relationship  between  the social  variables  potentially  important role to  play in  enhancing the
and the  governanice  activities.  Not surprisinigly,  an  performance  of government  institutions  in  Indonesia  and
individual  houselhold's  involvemnent  with  the village  in the  evolution  of good governance  more generally.
This paper-a product of the  Environm11ent  and Social  Development  Sector Unit,  East Asia and Pacific  Region-is part of
a larger  effort in  the region  to study  local  level institutions.  Copies of the paper are available  free from  the World Bank,
1818  H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please cotitactAnju Sachdeva, room MC8- 112, telephone 202-458-2717, fax
202-522-1666,  email  address asachdeva@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at
http://econ.wvorldbank.org.  The authors may be contacted at valatas((iworldbank.org,  lant_pritchett@ksg.harvard.edu,  or
anna  w@uclink.berkeley.edu.  March 2003.  (49 pages)
hrlc  1'ocvIci  Reseirch Working  Paper  Series dissemiinates the findings of wvork  in  progress to encoutrage tie exchange of ideas abonit
development issues. An ohjective of the series is to get the findings otit quiickly,  eveni  tf the presenitations  are  less than fully polished. Tbe
papers carry the nanies of the authors and should be cited accordinkgly. The findings, interpretations,  and co,icltsionis expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the atithors. They  dro  niot niecessarily represent the viei  of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
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Questions about improving the quality of government are more than just academic
in Indonesia today; they are pressing, practical questions.  Indonesia has long been
considered a classic example of a "developmental  authoritarian"  state-  one that fostered
economic success and delivered concrete material benefits as a claim to political
legitimacy while simultaneously creating institutions through which popular participation
in politics was structured,  channeled, and thereby marginalized.  With a radical
decentralization  of responsibilities to regional (district) governments underway,
continuing economic turmoil, and frequent shifts  in national leadership,  Indonesia is in
the midst of economic,  social, and political change.  From the national  to the local level,
the structures and behaviors taken for granted  during the Soeharto/New Order era are
being challenged and, in many cases, overturned.  This paper focuses on the role of
villagers' social activities in creating more participatory and accountable local
governments,  and aims to contribute an empirically grounded analysis to inform
discussions of the reforms of local governance.
Putnam (1992)2  argued that, even in a "modem"  and "developed" country like
Italy, the nature and type of social relationships were the most important determinant of
I We would like to thank many people who helped in  the long course of the LLI2 study and this
particular paper:  Scott Guggenheim,  Pieter Evers, Kamala Chandrakirana,  Robert Chase,
Christiaan  Grootaert, Michael Woolcock,  Sandy Jencks, Jeffrey Hammer, Deon Filmer, Menno
Pradhan, and Chitra Buchori provided valuable  comments and input during the course of this
research. Leni Dharmawan, Erwin Fahmi, R. Yando Zakaria and their respective regional teams
shaped and collected the data.  Financial support from the World Bank's Indonesia Country
Team, the Research  Support Budget, the Norwegian Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially
Sustainable Development,  and the ASEM Trust Fund is gratefully acknowledged.
2 Although it should be noted that the book is "with" Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti.
2the efficacy of the newly created regional governments.  This bold reinsertion of personal
and particularistic  social relationships  into discussions of the performance of public
sector bureaucracies  resonated powerfully with those battling the dominant approach to
economic development.  This approach, which relied primarily on a national  civil service
bureaucracy to deliver technically determined services that meet predetermined "needs"
of the population (Pritchett and Woolcock 2002) has been labeled "bureaucratic high
modernism"-the view of development as bringing activities under the control and order
of the state (Scott  1998) - or "institutional  monocropping"-the  idea that institutional
effectiveness  is independent of local conditions (Evans 2002)3.  This backlash against
"state centric"  approaches  has led to an enthusiasm in development  circles for new
approaches  (using terms like: "social capital" (Woolcock  1998, Narayan and Woolcock
1999); "beneficiary  participation"; "empowerment";  "social funds"; "community
development";  and  "deliberative development") that aim to engage end-users in
decision-making.
But an overly simplistic generalization that more "social capital/ participation/
empowerment leads to better local governance"  leaves at least three key questions
unanswered.  First, which types of social activities are beneficial?  Second, for whom
does governance  improve?  Third, can knowledge of social conditions actually facilitate
deliberate  action or design that would bring about improvements  in government
performance?
3 Of course there is by now an extensive ethnographic literature documenting how, even in
authoritarian  regimes with no effective formal  political opposition,  local social organizations and
associations  both resisted and structured the reality of government action (e.g.  Singerman (1995)
on Egypt, Seligmann (2002) on Peru).
3We examine the empirical link between hiouseholds'  social activities4 and
responses about four elements of the workings of village government:  information about
government activities (two questions), participation  in decision making (two questions),
voice and expression of discontent (three questions), government responsiveness to local
problems  (three questions).  We make two key distinctions.  First, we distinguish the
private impact of social activities-whether households who are more socially active
report higher quality village government-from the community impact of social
activities-whether households who live in communities where other households are
more socially active report higher quality village government.  Second,  we: distinguish the
impact of social activities  (e.g. participation in public meetings) that are directly related
to village government structures  from that of other social activities  (that are not explicitly
related to village government).  The "endogenous"  social activities are further divided
into three types: (i) socializing with friends or neighbors; (ii) participating in group
activities  within a network (usually organized around a specific event, such as harvest or
prayer); and (iii) participating in social  activities related to organizations  (such as
farmers' groups, formal religious groups, and crecdit unions that are distinguished by
having a permanent  leadership).  Both of these distinctions prove empirically important--
as the estimated associations of private and community and of social organizations  and
village government organizations with the proxies we use for governance are frequently
not even of the same sign.
4  It should be noted that the general term "social activities" includes all group activities that
households reported participating in,  not that the activities have a "social" purpose.  Some, such
as water user groups or credit cooperatives,  serve primarily economic functions while others are
mixed (e.g. a prayer group that includes a rotating credit scheme as part of its activities).
4Generally the private impact5 of participation  in village government activities is
positive--households that report more frequent participation in village government
organizations also report increased  access to information about government activities,
greater participation in decision making, and higher assessed quality of government
responsiveness.  However, the community impact of such activities  appears to be largely
negative-households  living in villages where other households report greater
participation in the village organizations report, on average, reduced  information, reduced
participation, less voice and rate government responsiveness  lower.  Surprisingly, the net
impact of increased participation in village government organizations  appears to be
negative-so for instance, even though the household that joins the village government
organizations  is more likely to be informed about the local budget the "crowd out" effects
on other households  are sufficiently large that fewer people  in the village know about the
budget.
On the other hand, broadly speaking, participation in social organizations  has
both positive private and community impacts on governance.  To illustrate, we show that
for one of the "voice" indicators (whether a household was involved in a protest action
about some village issue) households with higher engagement in social organizations
were more likely to be involved in a protest.  Even more interesting is that households
who  lived in villages in which other households reported higher engagement in social
5  One additional  caveat, in discussion of the results below we often use terms like "impacts" or
"effects."  Since we presently have no technical method that allows us to assert causality-
because we cannot rule out reverse causality-this  language is not an assertion of causality  but
merely avoids the pedantic repetition of  phrases  like "if these partial associations  represent causal
impacts the effect is ... "
5organizations also were more likely to be engaged in protest.  The net effect of higher
engagement in social activities is generally positive.
We are self-consciously avoiding  for now the obvious, but loaded and imprecise,
term "social capital" and are first just reporting on the empirical outcome of a survey.
Households were asked certain specific questions (often with limited possible answers);
their answers were recorded; and it is a factual question whether households who
reported more engagement in endogenous organizational activities were also more likely
to report that they knew about the village budget6. What one makes of those empirical
facts and how they potentially relate to concepts and theories about the world is another
question entirely.  Hence the sequence of the paper is: Indonesian context, data,
estimation, findings, and then theory, literature review, and implications all together at
the end.
I)  Indonesian context
Before describing the findings it is necessary to explain certain aspects of the
structure of Indonesian government.  We only cover the barest basics that are crucial to
understanding  local governance in Indonesia and to interpreting the findings presented in
this paper.  This section draws heavily on the qualitative and ethnographic studies done in
connection with the Local Level Institutions study.  In particular, Evers (2000) is a rich
6  This simple minded approach to method is not naivety: we have read and considered the
critiques of household  survey methods, the dangers of attempting to impose empirical clarity on
social complexity and even the dangers of the survey instrument itself as a tool of repression.
The household survey was embedded in a larger study which used a range of qualitative
techniques to address many of the same questions (Wetterberg  2002).
6and informative study on local governance in rural Indonesia in the immediate pre-crisis
period7.
First, we need to replace the potentially misleading word "village" with the
Indonesian term "desa"  A desa is fundamentally apolitical  and administrative
designation,  rather than a geographic or social one.  Although the term desa is often
translated as "village"  it needs to be understood as a structure imposed on local
communities  by the central government.  A 1979 law designated the existing boundaries
of the desas to create a complete, homogenous  structure for local governance.  The
resulting geographical units of the desa therefore do not necessarily correspond to the
definition of a "village" as a cluster of living units or to individuals'  own perceptions of
their basic social reality.  Rather, especially in less densely populated areas, a desa may
contain several widely dispersed clusters of household residences and primary social
affiliations may be to these clusters rather than the desa.
Second, the structures of desa government created in the 1979 law did not
consolidate existing practice but rather supplanted  the existing  structures of local
leadership.  Indonesia, a large and diverse country, has a wide range of ethnic and social
groups and a corresponding variety of indigenous  forms of governance organizations.
Traditional (adat) leaders or structures were not formally recognized in the new laws.
The new law on local administration created hierarchical  structures ranging from the desa
' We draw heavily on Evers (2000) because it is the best study, not only because  it is part of the
Local Level Institutions study, but also because  it is among the few studies of the mechanics of
local politics.  The New Order Indonesian government banned not just the development of
political organizations  in rural areas but also research on local politics (which could be easily
enforced since all fieldwork  required official permission).
7head (kepala desa) and local executive  council (LKMD) to a designated official for each
group (RT) and sub-group (RW) of households.
Third, in the rhetoric of the  1979 law the new desa organizations  were a means of
channeling a "bottom up" expression of the popular will, and the law created mechanisms
whereby villagers would participate in the planning process and express their
development needs.  The general perception among villagers and those who worked in
rural areas was that reality did not match the rhetoric:  the desa organizations  operated
"top down."  The desa apparatus were widely perceived as a means of co-opting  and
controlling all social forces at both the national  and local levels and of delivering the
programs and development priorities determined at the center.
During Soeharto's New Order era, the leacdership of the provincial  and district
(kabupaten) governments was appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs and was
dominated by retired (and active duty) military officers.  Even though there were local
elections the desa leaders had to be approved by and reported to this structure8. As the
first LLI Study showed, at the local level often a very narrow group controls the desa
government apparatus  in a way that does not always reflect a broad community
consensus (Evers 2000).
The resignation of Soeharto in May  1998 put in motion three linked but distinct
changes.  First, there were (generally)  free and fair general elections for the national and
8  The motivations for creating this structure are well beyond the scope of this paper but: (a) since
its birth Indonesia has experienced centrifugal pressures in various regions and the armed forces
(from which the New Order leadership  emerged) has always considered itself a bulwark of
nationalism and stressed the need for central  control, (b) without apportioning responsibility, the
New Order (Soeharto) government was unquestionably born in social chaos and brutal local
violence, an experience no one was anxious to repeat, and (c) the government in this period was
"developmentalist authoritarian,"  anxious to deliver on the concrete benefits of  "economic
8regional legislatures.  This altered the political landscape from top to bottom, shifting
power away from Soeharto's Golkar party towards now-President  Megawati
Soekarnoputri's PDI-P and a host of newly established political groupings that were
allowed to organize in rural areas.  Second, the legislature passed a set of laws that
initiated substantial decentralization  of government services from the center to districts
(mostly by-passing provinces)9. Third, as the center weakened there was an expansion in
local activity that addressed past and present grievances through both violent (e.g.  riots,
land seizures,  stoning local government offices (and officers)) and more "democratic"
means (a free press).
II) Local Level Institutions  Study Household  Data
We are going to estimate the relationship between social activities  and the
perceptions of desa government performance using multivariate regressions.  To do that
we need to specify the (a) the construction of each of the four social variables, (b) the
empirical  variables used to measure "governance,"  (c) the way we propose to distinguish
between private and community impacts of social activities, (d) the non-social variables
included in the regressions,  and (e) the functional  form.
The Local Level Institutions  study (LLI) is a large, complex research endeavor
carried out in 48 desas in three provinces (six districts), first in 1996 (LLII)  and again in
2000/2001  (LLI2).  The study combined both qualitative and quantitative work on issues
related to local governance,  including documenting the array of social activities of
development" to citizens as a means of sustaining legitimacy but less concerned with either local
or national mechanisms of "voice"from citizens.
9  It should be noted that, as part of the decentralization  effort, the 1979 law on village government
has been revoked.  Change has not been  immediate, however,  and most of the structures it created
still persist throughout the research area (Wetterberg 2002).
9households.  The first round of the Local Level Institutions study documented that, while
little recognized by officialdom,  local activities and spontaneous local organizations  have
flourished at the local level alongside the externally  imposed desa structures
(Chandrakirana  2000, Grootaert  1999).  In addition, analysis of the household data from
the first round found significant positive coefficient of a social capital index (formed as a
function of number of household group activities and their characteristics)  in a
multivariate regression on per capita consumption (Grootaert 2000).  This analysis also
provided some evidence of contributions of social capital to reported collective action
and evidence of differential  effects of different types of groups (Grootaert  1999, 2000).
In the second round of the LLI study a multi-module household questionnaire
collected information from 1200 households (30 households in each of 40 desas)' 0 . The
questionnaire included standard modules on: (a) demographic  information, (b) the
SUSENAS "short-form"  consumption expenditures, (c) household assets, (d) household
shocks and coping strategies.  In addition the survey collected information on two more
unique aspects: household social activities and households participation in, and
perceptions  of, desa government.
IIIA) Measures of  social engagement.
The survey elicited information on all hotusehold social activities--from pure
sociability to membership  in formal organizations.  To capture "sociability", households
were asked about the frequency with which they visited and were visited by other
households.  In addition, each household made a complete list of all its group activities in
the past month and their purpose.  For each group activity the household was asked if this
10activity was carried out by an organization with a fixed leadership.  Group activities that
did not involve an organization we call network activities while all others were
organizational. In addition, the respondent was asked about all groups that any member
of the household belonged to, whether the member was "active" and the frequency of
participation in those groups in the last three months and the purpose of the group (e.g.
religions, production, social service, etc.).
Table  1:  Classification scheme of the four types of social activities
Elements of the  Designations of the different social activities:  Examples
questionnaire
Visits to and  Sociability  Visits with friends,
from friends,  neighbors
neighbors,
relatives
Inventory of all  Network (activities in groups without fixed  Community work
group social  leadership)  (gotong royong),
activities  Organizational (activities in  Desa  e.g. desa Legislative
involving  groups with fixed leadership)  Government  council (LKMD),






Finally, the household was prompted about whether any member in the household
participated  in the activities of the desa government organizations.  For present purposes
the key distinction is between activities  in those organizations that were created  as an
integral component of desa government and all other social  organizations 11 .
10 There were eight less desas because one of the districts was in  NTT close to East Timor and
was not safe for researchers.
1"  This is based on the same information (the roster of all group activities)  but is a different
scheme than that used in analysis of the LLI I data (Grootaert  1999) that divided groups  into nine
functional categories by the primary purpose of the group (e.g. production group, religious group,
recreation, etc.).
I1Participation in (a) the desa legislative council (LMD), (b) the executive council
(LKMD), (c) official neighborhood organizations (RT or RW), (d) official women's
organization (PKK or Dasawisma), or (e)  official youth organization  (Karang  Taruna)
was counted as engagement in a "desa government organization."  Participation in all
other organizations was classified as "endogenous"  social organizations--even  though
some of these groups did have affiliation with the government (e.g. government
sponsored cooperatives).  The distinction is not therefore between "government" and
"non-government" organizations but between organizations that are part  of the structure
of local government and organizations  with other purposes.
We differentiate  the impact of the four types of social activities: sociability,
network, and desa government organizations,  and other social organizations  (see Tables 1
and 2).  However,  within each we simply add either activity or memberships--that  is,
there is no weighting within the categories to allow for different organizations to have a
stronger or weaker impact in creating  "social capital" or to have a stronger or weaker
association  with governance' 2. The problem of how to properly aggregate  the observed
range of social activities pervades all work on "social capital" and is almost certainly
intractable  in principle (see annex  1).
Table 2:  Average engagement by any household member in four classes of social activities
District  Sociability  Network  Social  Desa
(Kabupaten), Province  (number  activities  organizations  government
visits)  (activities in  (number of active  organizations
the last  memberships)  (participation in
month)  the activities)
Sarko (Jambi)  9.7  4.33  .387  1.80
Batanghari (Jambi)  10  4.35  .804  1.65
Banyumas (C. Java)  8.81  8.16  .859  2.17
12 Other studies of social capital have weighted membership  in various organizations by
characteristics of the organization thought to contribute to social capital (e.g.  horizontal
relationships  among members,  membership  inclusive across social categories,  frequency of
participation)-see Narayan and Pritchett (1996), Grootaert (2000).
12Wonogiri(C. Java)  | 7.85  | 6.51  =  .92  | 2.72
Ngada, NTT  8.85  | 4.68  2.06  2.87
Source:  Based on LLI2 data
IH.B)  Ten empirical  proxiesfor  four dimensions of  local governance
The LLI2 instrument also elicited household responses about desa government'3.
We used ten specific questions about four dimensions of govemance:  information,
participation,  voice, and  perceived responsiveness  to local problems.
Information. Households were asked if they knew about three types of
information associated with desa government:  the development programs operating in
the desa;  the use of desa funds; and funds available for development projects.  If the
household knew about "all three" we count them as informed.  On average, information
was quite widespread with between 45 and 50 percent of household having heard about
any one of desa budgets, use of funds or development projects and 35 percent having
heard of all three (Table 3).  In addition, all households were asked if information about
these desa government activities was "more open" than four years ago.  Perhaps
surprisingly given the political changes, only 20 percent thought information about all
three was "more open" than four years ago.
13  That these are household responses should be stressed as a considerable amount of the variation
in reported governance consists of differences  across individuals, not just differences across
villages.
13Table 3:  Percent of households informed about various aspects of desa budgets and
activity, by re  ion.
Percent of households  informed about:  All three
Region:  Use of desa  Funds for  Government  All three  more open
(kabupaten)  funds  development  Programs  than four
projects  available  _  years ago
Sarko  52.9  48.3  48.3  35.8  20.8
Batanghari  40.4  47.5  44.1  32.5  19.6
Banyumas  45.8  57.4  69.0  39.6  20.6
Wonogiri  36.4  48.5  52.7  20.9  11.7
Ngada  50.5  41.6  41.3  41.0  26.3
Sample
Average  45.2  48.7  51.1  34.0  19.8
Source:  LLI2 data.  Average is unweighted.
Participation  in desa decision-making  was assessed by asking households if they
participated in planning desa programs or if they participated in determining sanctions for
abuses by desa leaders.  In both instances there were three possible responses: no
participation, participation by giving opinion before decision was made, and participation
in making the decision.  About 63 percent reported no participation in desa planning,
with 20 percent providing an opinion and 17 percent reporting that they participated  in
the decision making.  The process of determining sanctions was more closed with 80
percent reporting no participation and only 7.4 percent reporting having participated  in
the decision (Table 4).
Table 4: Participation  in  desa decision making
District  Participation in desa planning  Participation in  determining sanctions
(kabupaten)  on desa leaders
Provided  Decision  Provided  Decision
None  Input  making  None  Input  making
Sarko  55.8%  29.2%  15.0%  72.5%  18.8%  8.8%
Batanghari  66.7%  24.2%  9.2%  80.0%  16.3%  3.8%
Banyumas  74.0%  19.0%  7.0%  90.9%  7.4%  1.7%
Wonogiri  79.5%  9.6%  10.9%  94.1%  2.9%  2.9%
Ngada  37.7%  20.9%  41.4%  69.5%  10.9%  19.7%
Sample average  62.7%  20.6%  16.7%  81.4%  11.3%  7.4%
Source:  LL12 data.  Average is unweighted.
14Voi&e-  To investigate the expression of"voice" in response to problems with desa
government,  households were asked whether dissatisfaction was expressed with the desa
leadership in the previous  year.  In 381  cases households reported that there was
expression of discontent with the desa leadership.  Households that reported an
expression of discontent were probed about the outcome:  most households reported that
there was "not yet" a solution;  a third reported a complete or partial solution; and in 4%
of the cases there was a solution but then the problem reemerged (Table  5).
Table 5:  Reported outcomes for households who report there was an
expression of dissatisfaction in their desa
Frequency  Percent
No solution  222  58.3
Completely successful  84  22.1
Some success  43  11.3
Temporarily successful  16  4.2
Not recorded  16  4.2
If there was no open expression of disapproval, respondents were queried about
why not.  For the 818 households that said there was no dissatisfaction  expressed with
desa leadership,  two very different reasons emerged for the lack of expression of
discontent.  Roughly three quarters  said that the reason for no expression of discontent
was that there was "no problem" (see Table 6).  In the remaining cases respondents
thought there was a problem, but reported a variety of reasons why, in spite of the
problem, there was no expression of dissatisfaction:  that people were afraid to express
their dissatisfaction,  that expression of dissatisfaction would not result in a change, or
that it was difficult to organize.
15Table 6:  Reasons given by those who report no expression of dissatisfaction with the desa
leadership:
Frequency  Percent
No problem  595  72.9
Was a problem, but afraid to express discontent  120  14.7
Was a problem,  but protest would be ineffective  62  7.6
Was a problem, but difficult to organize  17  2.1
Don't know  20  2.4
Other  5  .5
From these responses we created three indicators of "voice."  One, which we call
"protest," is whether anyone in the household was involved  in  "openly expressing
dissatisfaction."' 4 The second variable is a dichotomous indicator of lack of effective
voice: whether a household reports no expression of discontent  in spite of a problem with
the desa leadership.
The third "voice" variable combines the information about problems, expression
of discontent, and outcomes to approximate effectiveness.  For only those households that
report a problem we define a variable with three categories:  no expression (category A);
expression but no solution (category B); and expression with solution (category C).  As
these are categories, rather than cardinal numbers, we use ordered probit for this third
variable.
Government Responsiveness.  Households  were also asked about a variety of
problems facing their desa (households were prompted about two "economic" problems,
four "social" problems, and four "environmental"  problems).  If the respondent thought
there was a problem they were asked, who, if anyone, had attempted to address those
problems and one of the options was the desa government.  The frequency with which the
government is seen responding to existing problems is a crude indicator of its
14 The Bahasa Indonesia wording is: pernah menyatakan ketidakpuasan.
16responsiveness  to citizen concerns (see Table 7). Using these data in combination with
information on household and community participation in different types of
organizations, we can analyze variations in desa government involvement in addressing
community problems.
Table 7:  Fraction reporting various types of problems,  and for those who report
problems, the fraction reporting engagement  of desa government (pemerintah desa) in
addressing the  problem.
Region:  Economic  Social  Environmental
(kabupaten)  Fraction  desa gov't  Fraction  desa gov't  Fraction  desa gov't
reporting  Responds  reporting  Responds  reporting  Responds
Sarko  67.9%  7.9%  5.8%  50.0%  50.4%  27.2%
Batanghari  62.5%  3.3%  50.0%  36.6%  55.4%  49.6%
Banyumas  35.5%  16.2%  37.2%  45.5%  59.1%  44.0%
Wonogiri  19.7%  8.5%  11.7%  21.4%  52.3%  45.6%
Ngada  70.3%  29.7%  29.3%  48.5%  94.1%  74.6%
Average  51.2%  13.1%  126.8%  40.4%  62.3%  48.2%
The dependent variables  in the regressions will be these ten governance indicators
that are measures or proxies for the four concepts:  information (two indicators),
participation (two indicators), and voice (three indicators), government responsiveness
(three indicators).'5
II. C) Distinguishing  private, community, and  net impact
In order to distinguish between the private consequences  of engagement in
activities (that is, those benefits that accrue to the household) and the community
consequences of such involvement (that is, the impacts on other households) we use the
fact that the sampling is by desa.  We can therefore calculate for each household both
their own activity and the social activity of all other households in the desa
15 See Annex 3 for a summary of variables.
17Consider as an example membership in social organizations,  for the  i'h household
in the/h desa.  We can calculate the number of memberships of the household:
O' = Social organization  memberships of the ith household
The average  level of social organization membership  in the/" desa excluding that of the
ith household is:
o-iJ =  EOk/(Ni _1)
k=l,k*ei
Suppose there were a linear, causal,  relationship between whether the household
reports being informed about the desa budget, and the household's organizational
activities and the organizational  activities of all other households  in the desa (and other
variables in the matrix Z)16:
Informed  ,j [= l if  yes ] = a  + /p  * 0i +  3' * o-0i +  Z,Z E j
The private impact of the ith household joining one additional social organization on the
likelihood that household is informed is  8P.
The impact of ith household joining one additional  social organization on all other
households  in the desa is to raise the "desa less household" average by 1/Nj  for each
household.  The community impact of the ith household's increased organizational
activity is then 8s / N,  on each other householcd in the desa.  This could either be zero, if
there is no social interaction at all, positive, if the ith household shares information with
16 The major problem with the linear specification (of the "index function" for probit) is the lack
of interactive effects between the household's participation the magnitude of participation of
others.  Strictly speaking in the form  we now estimate the impact of an additional households
joining a desa govemment organization on another household is the same irrespective of the level
of the household's  participation in  desa activities.  In future work we will test for interactive
effects.
18others, or negative, if the ith household gaining information tends to exclude other
households and hence reduces the likelihood they are informed.
The total number of people in the desa informed about the budget is just the sum
of the individuals:
Informed in desai =  Informed,j 1
If we are interested  in the net impact on the total number of households  in the village
who are informed this is the private impact plus the sum of individual impacts:
d(Informed in desa )  dinformed,  dInformedk,
dO'  dO'  k*￿  dOi
The sum of N. -1 across those impacts of magnitude  /3s / N,  is just  ,Bs * (Nj -1N)
d(Informed in desa)  6P  A  *(NJ  l 
dO'  PPys  Nj)
The net impact on the number of people in the desa informed  about the budget
associated with the ith household's  increased organizational membership  is just the sum
17 of the private and community impacts
The reasons for distinguishing the private, community, and net impacts of social
activities will be discussed further in the section on implications, but for now let us just
illustrate some of the possible outcomes.
''  For simplicity we ignore the N-l/N term-which in our samples of 30 per village is near one in
any case.
19Table  8:  Possible patterns of empirical relationships between organizational  activity  and
perceptions of governm  ce
Desa government or  anization  Social organizations
Private  Community  Net  Private  Community  Net





Positive private effects of desa and social organizations and....
No social linkages  +  0  +  +  0  +
(zero linkages or  (equal to  (equal to
externalities of  private)  private)
social activities)
Zero sum (positive  +  0  +  0
private, negative  (private and  (private and
offsetting  community  community
community effects)  offset)  offset)
"Crowd-in" (positive  +  +  ++  +  +  ++
externalities  of  (larger than  (larger than
social activities)  either)  either)
"Crowd out"  +  +/0/-  +  +/0/-
(negative  (sign  (sign
externalities of  depends on  depends on
social activities)  magnitudes)  magnitudes)
Table 8 assumes a positive relationship  between organizational  engagement and
perceptions of desa government organizations.  We are assuming that households that are
more active in social activities are better informed and also participate more in formal
decision-making.  While it would be unusual if participation in the desa government
organizations had no association with household perceptions of governance,  it is possible
that engagement in non-desa government organizations is unrelated to governance.  It is
also possible that active engagement in social organizations precludes household
participation in desa government groups, if these two types of organizations  have
overlapping and competing functions.
Even assuming there are positive associations between both desa government and
other social activities and the households'  perceptions  of local governance,  there is the
20question of whether-there are any effects of these social activities on other households.
There are four plausible conjectures,  each of which would lead to a different pattern of
results:
First, no externalities-a  household's perception of "voice" in the desa could
depend on their characteristics and social activity only and not be affected by other desa
members'  social activity.  The community impacts are empirically  small and  the net
effect is determined by the direction of the private effects.
Second, zero sum.  Perhaps there is a fixed number of people who participate  in
decision making, or who are informed about activities, or who feel there is "voice" and
hence improvements for one household within a desa come at the expense of another.
Or, it could be that as the participation  of other households rise other households
participation  falls as the "free ride" on the activities of others.  Then, if the private effect
is positive, the community effect would be negative of the same magnitude and the net
effect zero.
Third, positive externalities ("crowd in").  It could be that increased information
acquired by one household is more likely to be transmitted to another household when the
social organizational activity in the desa is high.  Or perhaps it is easier to organize
villagers to act jointly to express discontent with desa government performance  when
there are more social connections among them.  In this case the community effect would
be positive and the net effect would be larger than either the private or community effect
along.
Fourth, exclusion (more than onefor one "crowd out").  It also possible that
members actively exclude non-members and as the number of people involved in an
organization  gets larger their ability to exclude  others becomes stronger.  In this case
21non-members would feel that they have less inf  ormation, voice or participation in
decision making as more other people become members18. It is possible that the strength
of the exclusion effect is stronger than the positive private effect so that the net effect is
negative.
III.D) Control variables.
To estimate the partial associations we control for other variables that may
influence household reports of desa level govemance.  For instance, more educated
households may both be more likely to be involved in organizational activity and may be
better informed about government budgets.  The household demographic  and economic
characteristics  included in each multivariate regression are: (a) household consumption
expenditures (as a proxy for household income), (b) education of the head of the
household, (c) age of the household head, (d) whether the head of the household is a
government worker,  (e) whether the household head works in agriculture, (f) whether the
household is headed by a female, and (g) size of the household.
We also include a categorical variable for each of the five districts.  These are
frequently important as there are substantial differences  across the regions. Ngada in
NTT province, which is a predominantly Christian province (primarily Catholic), has a
markedly different pattem of organizational  activity (in table 2 Ngada has more than
twice the level of "social organization" activity of any other region).  Controlling for this
difference in levels implies that the effects are estimated only using the differences across
households and desa within a district.
IIIE) Functionalform
18 This obviously can only be true over certain ranges of participation--as starting from zero
22All of the governance indicators except one are binary variables (yes/no) and a
probit estimator is used.  The marginal effects--the  increase in a household's probability
of answering "yes" (e.g. "are informed", "did participate")  associated with a unit increase
in the independent variable-are reported, along with the p-levels of the test for the index
function coefficient being zero.  Our indicator of "effective voice" is a categorical
variable with three levels and hence ordered probit is used.  In that case the marginal
effect of moving from the second to the highest category are reported, along with the p-
levels of the index function coefficients.  (If the preceding two sentences were not
obvious, Annex 2 is a brief discussion of probit and ordered probit estimates and
results)1 9.
IP) Findings
The raw findings of the regressions are reported in Annex 3. We discuss the
findings in three  sections, each of which examines  the relationships of the governance
proxies across the range of independent variables:  first, the "control" variables,
sociability  and social networks; second, the results for participation in the desa
government organizations;  and finally, the results for social organizations.
IVA)  Household  characteristics,  sociability, and  social networks.
Household characteristics. The household characteristics included in the
regressions generally emerged with the "expected"  signs.  Households with higher
schooling (significant and positive in five of ten regressions), households with a
participation or nearing  100 percent participation one cannot have the same effect.
9  One aspect of the results yet to be addressed  is that the standard  errors are not corrected for the
possibility of within cluster correlation of the error terms.  This could lead to an overestimate of
the precision of estimation and hence an overstatement  of levels of statistical  significance.
23government worker (positive and significant in five of ten regressions),  and household
with higher expenditures per person (positive and significant only two of ten) reported
higher levels of the governance proxies.  Agricultural households had mixed results (e.g.
more likely to report government responded to environmental problems  but less likely to
report the government responded to social problems).
Consistent with qualitative evidence about the tendency of existing mechanisms
to excluded women (DFID, 2000) female headed households reported statistically
significantly less participation (on both proxies), less voice (on two of three proxies) and
less responsiveness of government to economic problems.  Older households seem to fare
somewhat better than female-headed  ones.  'The older the head of the household the less
likely the household is to report engagement in protest; however, the household is also
more likely to report effective voice (perhaps precluding the need for protest).
Regional controls.  There were some patterns across the districts.  Households in
Ngada were more likely to report government responsiveness  (two of three proxies) and
more voice (two of three proxies).  Wonogiri respondents report less information (one of
two proxies), less participation (on both proxies) and less responsiveness to social
problems.  For present purposes these cross district differences are a "control"  and we
leave the interpretation of these cross district differences to the qualitative work as part of
the larger LLI investigation.
Sociability.  For the number of visits each household made or received, we did
not attempt to distinguish between private and community effects and record private
impacts only.  We find that in nine of the ten cases greater sociability was associated with
higher levels of the governance proxies-but the magnitude and significance of the
24effects was quite weak (statistically significant only twice), and the marginal effects were
empirically  small.
Social networks.  The estimated private and community impacts of network
activities were quite small.  Interestingly,  the only case in which participation in social
networks is statistically significant for both the private and community variables is for
desa government response to social problems.  Households with greater network
activities reported a greater degree of government response and those households  living
in villages with more activity also reported greater desa government responsiveness  (this
is of course controlling for their own level of social network activity). In villages with
more vibrant network activities,  such as collective harvesting and other gotong royong
activities, the government may rely on these networks to mobilize villagers in response to
problems.
IV B)  Desa government organizations
Private  impacts.  The single strongest result to emerge from the regressions is that
household who report higher levels of activity in the desa government organizations also
report that their household is better informed, more likely to participate, more likely to
report effective voice in the desa (though the household is less likely to report having
engaged in protest), and, for two of the three indicators, more likely to report the
government  is responsive to local problems.  This aspect of the empirical results  is more
a relief than an inspiration-after all, the objective of the desa organizations is to provide
information and participation in local decisions.  It should come as no great surprise that
those that participate report they are more likely to be inforrmed about desa government
activities and participate in decisions.  It is reassuring that the data say what we would
25have expected to be true:  crudely put, people who go to meetings about budgets are more
likely to know about budgets.
Community impacts.  The most striking and original result to emerge from this
empirical exercise is that the community impact of desa government organizations
appears to be negative.  That is, after statistically controlling for both household
characteristics  (e.g. education, gender of the head) and the household's social activities
(including the household's own participation in desa government activities), living in a
desa in which other households  are more engaged  in the desa government activities is
associated with a household reporting less information  (both level and change), less
participation in decision making, less voice, and less government responsiveness to
economic and social problems.  While only six of the nine coefficients that support this
interpretation are statistically significant at the conventional levels, we regard this as an
20 overwhelming preponderance of the evidence
20  Some of the difference is in statistical power and nearly all of the estimates are imprecise-as is
to be expected given the nature of the data and the phenomena under investigation.  For instance,
the summary table reports that "desa less household activity"  in desa government organizations
reduces participation in desa planning by 19.2 percent (-.066/.344) and the underlying
coefficients p-level is .058 and hence is "statistically  significant" at the  10 percent level.
Participation in determining sanctions, on the other hand, is reduced 28 percent (-.039/.138) based
on a coefficient with a p-level of .103, and hence is just barely not statistically significant at the
10 percent level.  In our view making too much of these fine distinctions in  p-levels-treating
these two as qualitatively  different because one is modestly below and another barely above some
conventional level-is a statistical significance  :Fetish (McCloskey and Zilliak 1995).  However,
there are also elements of the table in which the p-level is very high-the p-level on "desa less
household"  for response to social problems is .623 which means even the sign conveys little
information.
26Table 9:  Membership in  desa government organizations  and ten proxies for governance.
(Italicized items are consistent with the hypothesis of positive private effects of desa government
and either zero sum or crowd out community effects).
Pred.  Marginal  Percentage  Marginal  Percentage  Sum of  Percentage
prob.  effects  change  effects  change  marginal  change
(p-level)  (p-level)  effects
Private  Communty  Net
(Household)  (Village les  Household)  (Sum  of  the  two)
HH  informed  .041  -2  0  -04  13S
about 3 types  .327  (001)  12.5%  (009)  -26.0%  -.044  -13.5%
HHU-  reports all 3  .2  .3
"more open"  0.186  (029  15.6%  -19.4%  -.007  -3.8%
Some participation  0.067  -0.066
in planning desa  0.344  (000)  19.5%  -19.2%  0.001  0.3%
programs  00(58
Some participation  0.031  -0.039
in determining  0.138  (  22. 7%  (103)  -28.3%  -0.008  -5.6%
sanctions  ___  __  ___  (  03
HH involved  in  0.0074  8.3  -0.045  -506%  -0.0376  -42.2%
protest  0.089  (303,)  8.%  (021)  _50_6__0_037  __42__2_
No expression  in
spite of problem  0.174  -0.026  -14.9%  0.094  540%  0.068  39.1%
(positive is  less  (013~)  (DOG,)
voice)__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Most effective  -0.047
expression  026  0.042  7-047
(problem, voice,  0.236  (000)  18.1%  (124)  -19.9%  -0.0043  -1.8%
solution)
Economic  .013  -.083  -109.5%  -.071  -92.9%
Problems  .076  (.145)  166%  (001)  )  05__71  929
Social  Problems  .389  -.013  -3.4%  1303  -103%  -.  053  -13.7%
Envioronmental  .609)  .1340
Problems  .523  .028  45.4%  (004)  25.7%  .163  31.1%
Notes:  Bolded items are based on probit coefficients  statistically significant at a p-level of  10%  level or lower.
a) see Annex 2  for a description  of the reporting of the probit results.
Net impact.  With positive private and negative community  effects the net impact
of greater involvement by an additional household  could go either way.  What is truly
striking  about the empirical results is that, for eight of the ten indicators, the net impact is
negative.21  For example, the estimates for information awareness suggest that
households who are members of one additional desa government organization are 4.1
percent more likely to report knowing all three types of information (and are also more
likely to report improvements in transparency).  But the community impact is negative,
21  Note that the positive sign for one of the voice indicators (no expression in spite of existing
problems) indicates  a negative (i.e.,  detrimental) impact.
27and even larger-where  desa (less the household) average membership is higher each
household is 8.5 percent less likely to be aware  of local government information.  This
suggests that one household increasing its participation in the desa government
organizations (which, at least in rhetoric, were created to channel information) reduces
the number of households who know about the budget by 4.4 percentage points (13.5
percent).  Even though the joining household is much more likely to be aware of the
budget, its neighbors are each sufficiently less likely to know about the budget that the
total number informed  is estimated to go down as engagement in desa government
organizations increases.
Although we do not estimate their precision, the magnitude of the net effects are
substantial:  increasing average membership  in the organizations by one unit reduces the
probability of a household being involved in a protest by 42 percent, the likelihood of
"effective  voice" by 39 percent, of reporting responsiveness  to economic: problems by 93
percent.  What is surprising is that the effect of the desa government organizations  seems
to go beyond a "zero sum" result in which positive private and negative community
cancel out.  If interpreted causally these estimates of the net impact suggest the seemingly
paradoxical conclusion that an individual joining a desa government organization reduces
the number of people who are informed.  Rather than being modes of disseminating
information broadly the desa government organizations appear to have disseminated
information down the "chain of command" but not outside of that chain.  Access to desa
government information  and decision-making miechanisms appear to have been closely
guarded with non-members increasingly excluded from these resources.
Figure  1 summarizes the results from table 1 on the private, social, and total
associations (measured as the marginal effects) of desa governance  organization
28participation and governance indicators.  As can be  seen the private effects are
consistently positive (9 of 10 cases), the community impacts are consistently  negative  (9
of 10 cases) and the sum of the two is consistently negative or essentially zero (nine of
ten cases).
Figure 1: Probit regression  "marginal effects"  of desa
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IVB)  Social organizations
The evidence for the impact of social organizations is suggestive, but frankly,
damned elusive.
Private  impacts.  There is evidence of positive impact of social organizations,
although it is weaker than for desa organizations.  For seven of the ten indicators there is
a positive association so that households which participate more in social organizations
29are more likely to be informed (both indicators), participate in village decisions (both
indicators), be involved in a protest, and report  the government is responsive to economic
and social problems (see Annex 3).  However,  only four of the seven estimated effects
are statistically significant at conventional  levels (and in many cases arefar from
significant).  But even though there is no formal connection between social organizations
and desa government affairs, there is evidence that more engagement generally is
associated with more knowledge and participation in desa decision making.
Community impact.  The evidence for a  positive private spillover effect of
participation  in social organizations is decidedly mixed.  For half of the indicators the
sign of the coefficient indicates a positive impact.  While higher social organization
membership of others in the village is associated with more expression of voice (the sign
is negative because the variable is not expressing  discontent), it is also associated  with
less participation in determining sanctions.  The coefficients  are generally empirically
small; while a one unit increase in social organizations  is associated with being 30
percent more likely to be involved in a protest and 32 percent less likely to report "no
voice", for most of the other variables the impact is much smaller (e.g. less than ten
percent more likely to report "more open").
30Table  10:  Membership  in social organizations and ten proxies for governance.
(Italicized  items are consistent with the hypothesis of positive private effects of social
organizations  and positive community effects, items bolded are statistically significant at the 10
percent level).  _  ______tag  Margi  ____Pe_r_entage
Pred.  Marginal  Percentage  Marginal  Percentage  Sum of  1  Percentage
prob.  effects  change  effects  change  marginal  change
(p-level)  I  __  (p-level)  effects  I
Private  Community  Net
(Hou  old)  (Village les  Household)  (Sum of the two)
HH informed  .0099  .015
about 3 types  .327  (495)  5.3%  (-.651)  8.1%  .-.005  -1.6%
HH reports all 3
"more open"  .185  .021  11.4%  (031)  6.5%  .033  17.8%
Some participation
in planning desa  0.344  0.050  14.4%  -0.008  -2.2%  .04  12.2%
programs  (.001)  (.832)
Some participation  0.026  -0.042
in determining  0.138  (.011)  18.6%  (.088)  -30.1%  -.016  -11.5%
sanctions  (01)(08
HH involved in  0.012  0.028
protest  0.089  (104)  1  13.5%  (127)  31.5%  0.04  44.9%
No expression in
spite of problem  0.174  0.0054  3.1%  -0.056  -32.2%  -0.0506  -29.1%
(positive is  less  (.643)  (.037)
voice)
Most effective
expression  0236  -0.003  -1.3%  0.0143  6.1%  0.011  4.8%
(problem, voice,  (.763)  (629)
solution)  .
PErcoblemsc  .076  .012  15.1%  .0171  15.8%  .024  30.9%
Social Problems  .389  .047  12.1%  -.057  -14.7%  -. 010  -2.6%
Environmnental  -.006  -.034
Problems  .523  .006  -1. 1%  (.456)  -6.5%  -.040  -7.6%
Notes:  Bolded  items are based on probit coefficients statistically significant at a p-level of  10% level or lower.
a) see Annex 2 for a description of the reporting of  the probit results.
Net impact.  Looking across the ten indicators, the net effect of social
organizations stands in sharp contrast to that of the desa government groups.  The sum of
the private and community impacts indicates that increased activity in social
organizations is usually associated with improved governance outcomes.  However,  for
some of the indicators (such as participation in determining sanctions), a negative
community impact outweighs the positive private effect.  In spite of the mixed results
(both in terms of statistical significance and direction of signs), it is worth noting the
generally beneficial  effects of higher engagement in social organizations.  Although they
31Figure 2: Probit regression  "marginal effects"  of social
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were created for different purposes (e.g., economic,  social, religious, etc.), these groups
produce better governance outcomes than desa government organizations,  which were
explicitly created to channel information and allow for participation in decision-making.
Figure 2 summarizes the results.  The private effects are generally positive or very
small.  The community impacts vary widely both in sign and in magnitude.  The net
effect is "substantially"  positive (greater than a ten percent increase in the indicator)  in
five cases (more open budgets, more participation in programs, household engagement  in
protest, expression of voice and responsiveness to economic problems)  and only in one
(participation in sanctions) is the association substantially negative.
IV C) Regressions on desa aggregates
32If we perform the same regressions  as desa averages we roughly reconfirm the
above results, but also demonstrate the potential losses from focusing exclusively on desa
aggregated data, even in examining community impacts.  Table  11  shows OLS
regressions of desa averages of the three reported voice variables on desa averages of the
social activity and control variables22. In each case the sign of average social
organizational  membership  is associated with higher expressions of voice.  In contrast,
average participation in the desa government organizations is associated with less voice.
The magnitudes are roughly comparable with the sum of the two effects reported  in tables
9 and  10 (see "Total  HH" column in Table I 1) -desa government organizations  are
associated with 51 percent less protest in the averages while the household data suggest a
42 percent decrease.  No expression of discontent in spite of problems is 28 percent more
likely when estimated with the averages,  39 percent more likely from the household data.
While the household data suggest only a modest decline in the probability of being in the
most effective voice category,  the aggregates suggest an 18 percent reduction in
"effective voice" (although aggregating  to desa averages requires treating the categories
as cardinal).
There are two large advantages of using the household  data over the desa
averages.  First, without the household  level data one cannot see that the desa aggregate
impact is a combination of private and community effects.  For the desa government
organizations  a strong positive private effects  is generally offset by a more than
compensating negative community impact.  Second, when using desa averages none of
22 With the two binary variables the average is just the fraction of households answering "yes" but
with the "effective  voice" variable  we have to assume (as we did not before) that the categories
can be treated as cardinal numbers so they can be averaged.
33the estimates are  strongly statistically significant,  almost certainly the combination of
attenuation from the reduced signal in aggregated data plus the much smaller number of
observations.
Table I 1:  Regression  results of voice variables on desa averages (OLS estim a  )ion)
Protest activity  Exists a problem but no  Effective voice
expression
(positive sign is less
voice)
Coeff.  % change,  Coeff.  % change, one  Coeff.  % change, one
(p-  one unit  unit  (p-  unit
level)  Agg..  Total  level)  Agg  Total  level)  Agg.  Total
HH  _  HH  HH
Sociability  .003  2.5  -.027  -14.6  .0039  0.4%
(.813)  (.164)  _  (.924)
Network activity  .015  12.4  .0024  1.3  .026  2.9
(.434)  (.941)  (.685)
Desa  government  -.062  -51.2  -42.2  .053  28.6  39.1  -.162  -18.1  -1.8
organizations  (.081)*  (.350)  _  (.150)
Social  .022  18.2  44.9  -.029  -15.7  -29.1  .094  10.5  4.8
organizations  (.642)  (.704)  (.524)
Control variables  None significant  F+, A-  Y-,F-,
Regions  Ngada+  Included, none significant  Included,  none significant
N  42  42  41
R2  .612  .452  .569
Adjusted R2  .388  .135  .311
Source:  LLI 2 data.
P9 Interpretation  and Implications:  Literatures, theory
The desa government organizations  imposed by the Indonesian central
government, which were ostensibly designed as channels of "participation" to improve
local governance,  are apparently less effective than social organizations at producing
desirable governance outcomes-in fact greater participation appears to worsen
aggregate outcomes.  Less rigidly structured groups (even if sponsored by government)
and those that are locally initiated are better able to facilitate broad participation,
information-sharing,  responsiveness and accountability measures than the "uniforn
blueprint"  groups introduced in the creation of the official desa structure.
34These findings are consistent  with an interpretation, based on the LLI fieldwork,
that the desa government organizations  are used as a mechanism of social control.  More
participation  in these groups allows for more effective control of decision making and
does not represent a broadening of information,  voice, and participation  beyond those
directly involved.  However,  the data are not compelling for this interpretation as we have
no way of technically pinning down the direction of causation responsible for the
23 observed empirical associations
These empirical findings raise three important issues that relate both specifically
to Indonesia and to literatures on social capital,  decentralization  and local  governance,
and project design more generally.
In the Indonesian context there are both issues of project design and of the reform
of governance structures.  There is a growing,  empirically founded, consensus that
projects that provide local services are more effective when they incorporate the intended
beneficiaries  in the project24 . But details matter:  how "participation" is structured and
through what intermediary organizations makes a difference.  Isham and Kahkoinen  1999
compared  project success in water supply between two types of projects carried out in the
same region of Indonesia:  the Village Infrastructure Project (VIP) gave the desa
legislative  council (LKMD) final choice of design while the Water Supply and Sanitation
in Low Income Communities  (WSSLIC) project facilitated participation through water
user associations.  Although the WSSLIC user groups may have been predicted as more
23 The difficulty is that to do the procedure of "instrumental variables"  one needs valid
instruments and we have not found a valid and informative  instrument for "village  less HH"
social activity.  We attempted using lagged social activities from the  1996 survey as an
instrument but, perhaps surprisingly, the power of the instrument in the first stage was too low
and the standard errors on the "social" terms grew very large.
35participatory, the final say for these projects rested with the village head and in some
cases the' village choice was overridden by project staff in the interests of budget and
timetable concerns.  Even though both projects intended to be "participatory", the VIP
projects in which villagers had greater say operated substantially better, had higher
citizen satisfaction  (38 percent were "very satisfied" with VIP versus 24 percent in
WSSLIC), and had a greater impact on health (54 percent reported improved health in
VIP versus 33 percent in WSSLIC).
Qualitative results for the second LLI Study indicate that projecl  designs in the
research area have grown increasingly participatory.  Before 1998, villagers reported only
12% of projects giving them a direct say in project planning decisions.  After 1998, they
were given the opportunity to participate  directly in planning in 22% of government
projects.  There has also been a simultaneous  shift in satisfaction with project outcomes
(37% satisfied or somewhat satisfied with pre- 1998 projects vs. 50% for post-1998
projects) (Wetterberg 2002).
In Indonesia it is recognized that for decentralization  to lead to better governance
the pre-existing  desa institutions will have to undergo major changes.  Indonesia has
embarked on a radical decentralization  of power and responsibility to its regions
(districts).  The success of this decentralization will to a large extent depend on the extent
to which changes from top down (creating democratically elected district legislative
councils) and bottom up (creating  effective desa structures) can be integrated.
The qualitative data from LLI2 show that while some modifications to desa
structures are underway,  the direction of change is not yet clear.  The main innovation
24 The empirical evidence is the strongest for rural water supply (Briscoe and Gamn  1995, Narayan
36introduced by the decentralization at the village level is an elected council (Badan
Perwakilan  Desa or BPD) that is intended to provide a countervailing force to the often
unchecked  power of the village head.  Although a small number of villages have seen
accountability  efforts pioneered by the BPD, most villagers report that the councils'
performance has been disappointing and indistinguishable from that of existing desa
government structures.
These issues in Indonesia reflect more general issues in the literatures  on social
capital, decentralization,  and project design.  First, the benefits of decentralization are
contingent on being able to structure responsive mechanisms at the local level.  As
Platteau (2000), Bardhan and Mookerjee (2002) and many others have pointed out, local
politics are as much subject to "capture" by elites as those at the national  level25.
Second, these results reinforce the point that it is the nature of social
organizations  and associational  life, not their sheer number or density, that matters.
Studies of social capital are often based on the assumption that more ties (or more ties
with given characteristics)  are inherently better.  While denser social organizations of the
type that creates relationships of trust among citizens might facilitate collective action
and greater efficacy of government26, many political outcomes are a zero sum contest.  In
these cases, more social organizations  can influence the outcome in favor of (or against) a
1998, Isham, Narayan and Pritchett 1995).
25 One of the arguments for centralization in  the immediate post-colonial  era in many locations
(Africa, India, Indonesia) was that the power of local leaders was an obstacle and that only
through national govemments and non-local coalitions (e.g. of peasants,  labor) could a socially
progressive  agenda be implemented.
6 Research in  the US has demonstrated connections  between ethnic divisions and the quality of
public services (Alesina,  Baqir, and Easterly  1999).  There is also an empirical  literature that
proposes a link between "trust" and economic performance.
37particular  group, but not make everyone better off27.  Caste associations in India often
organize precisely to protect their interests within the village and locality.  Wade's (1988)
brilliant study of collective action and irrigation in South India showed how villages with
superior organizational abilities were able to be more effective in bribing the government
officials to allocate them more water than less well organized neighboring villages.  The
present results, showing that different kinds of groups have opposite spillover impacts,
reinforce  the making of sharp distinctions  between types of organizations  in their effect
on governance outcomes.
Third, these results also raise the difficulty of using knowledge about the existing
empirical associations between social activities and governance  to engineer
improvements in local governance through deliberate institutional innovations or policy
action.  That is, it might seem that the obvious implications of our empirical results  are
two-fold: (a) to make local decentralization  effective,  reforms need to reduce the powers
of (or eliminate) existing desa organizations and delegate greater powers to, or at least
incorporate more in decision making, the social organizations that have positive effects
and (b) make project implementation more 'participatory'  by creating project specific
mechanisms  for local input and control.  However, while these reactions are on the right
track, there are two problems that must be faced.  First, well meaning  efforts to create
"beneficiary participation" or "user management"  in projects must cope with the fact that
these new local organizations  and institutions do not arise on a blank slate, but on top of
an already complex pattern of local social organization and activity.  Second,  discussions
27  There are of course many examples of the negative effects of social organizations.  The Klu
Klux Klan was an NGO that attracted millions of members to the cause maintaining the privileges
38about changes in the decision making scope of local organizations  need to be embedded
in a coherent theory of the social behavior of individuals as people and organizations  will
change  as conditions change.  That is, attempts to exploit the existing beneficial nature of
social organizations may well create pressures for the organizations  to change their
character-if organizations which have beneficial spillover  effects are charged with high
stakes decision making tasks then the purposive behavior of individuals with respect to
the organizations  should be expected to change.
Spontaneous  social action frequently arises to address problems of collective
action-often in face of government failure and "below the radar" of official notice.  For
instance, Ostrom (1990) has shown that the "tragedy of the commons" is not inevitable.
In the right social conditions collective  action can reach stable and sustainable solutions
to the problem of "common pool" resources, such as fisheries, water allocations,  and
irrigation 28.  In Indonesia the practice of gotong royong-common labor to address local
problems -long antedates the New Order.
But these type of spontaneous, endogenous solutions are the product of existing
physical and economic conditions (e.g. the geographic extent of the "common"  pool, the
distribution of benefits among users) and social forces.  As Fox (1996) illustrates for the
case of Mexico, specific constellations of externally  imposed government groups and
other social organizations have all played roles in shaping current capacities for collective
action and particular governance outcomes. Shifts in function in one part of current
of one social group at the expense of vicious, often  lethal, suppression of the rights of other
citizens.
28 In  a particularly telling example of how the "official"  sector is (willfully)  ignorant of social
realities Ostrom recounts the tale of a delayed  irrigation project that planned to provide irrigation
to "unirrigated" areas.  The delay allowed a closer investigation of the area which found dozens
of fully functional irrigation associations in this supposedly "unirrigated" area.
39arrangements  are likely to cause both intended and unexpected consequences throughout
the system.  Attempts to deliberately create new local decision making organizations as
an integral part of service delivery have met with both successes and failures.  There is a
great deal of evidence that changing the delivery of localized services from a "top down
technocratic"  matter for civil servants to incorporating more feedback from citizens is, in
general,  associated with more successful  outcomes.  However, attempts to create "project
participation" have also met with-or created-disasters.  Uphoff's (1992) account of the
Gal Oya irrigation project in Sri Lanka details the ways in which things can go wrong-
and, later, right.  Creating new institutions with decision-making power will inevitably
conflict with existing arrangements.
In proposing specific institutional reforms in the structure of local government
organizations or project designs (e.g.  decision making on investment projects) both the
private and social impacts of social capital need to be considered (Bourdieu  1986,
Coleman  1990).  That is, there is a branch of the social capital literature that emphasizes
the private benefits to the individual/household  of their social connections  in obtaining
jobs, credit, in marketing arrangements,  smoothing income shocks, and even in obtaining
benefits from the government (Singermann  1995).  In this literature the individuals act
purposively to create and maintain social connections because of the benefits the
connections provide29. The other branch of the social capital  literature ernphasizes the
social  benefits of social capital and that activities undertaken  by individuals perhaps
29 Glaeser,  Laibson and  Sacerdote (2000) advocate this "economic approach"  in which they
"analyze the formation of social capital using a model of optimal individual  investment
decisions" (p. 3).
40exclusively because of the benefits of the activity itself have positive impacts on people
besides themselves30.
The reason these two have to be considered simultaneously is that changes in the
scope of potential benefits of engaging in social activities will change people's  behavior
in ways that may change the consequences.  Take a crude and entirely hypothetical
example.  Suppose that the data said that information  spillovers from desa (LKMD)
meeting were negative and from mosque attendance were positive.  Then one might
conclude that if the legally required discussion of the desa budget were moved from the
LKMD to the mosque (suppose  immediately following the weekly service) that this
would have enormous spillover effects.  But this would not take into account that the
people who show up at the LKMD meeting do so (among other reasons) in order  to learn
about the budget-and perhaps because they have a personal interest in budget
information.  If the budget discussion is moved to the mosque this changes the incentives
of people to attend the mosque-perhaps in ways that reduces the beneficial spillover
effects observed from mosque attendance  in the existing model.
Conclusion
The social realities of rural Indonesia are complex and rapidly changing.  The
increasing democratization  at the national level and the ongoing decentralization  will
bring about rapid changes in the power dynamics at the local level.  The present empirical
result is just one small piece of the critically important puzzle of how to create open,
effective, and accountable  local governance.  This work extends the earlier empirical
30 Of course in  every  individual motivations are complex and church  attendance may well be
correlated with some material benefits or other non-religious returns (Glaeser and  Sacerdote
2000) and yet still be predominantly  motivated by belief.
41work demonstrating the "top down" realities of the desa administrative  structure (Evers
2000) and the vibrancy of local institutions even before the political changes
(Chandrakirana  2000). On a broader level this empirical work extends the literature on
"social capital" by demonstrating conclusively that not all local organizations  are created
equal.  Depending on who is doing the organizing, and why, increased participation in
local organizations  can either be exclusionary and reinforce existing decision making
powers and structures (as appears to be the case for the mandatory government
organizations) or can widen the base of voice, information,  and participation  and increase
the responsiveness of local government.
Together they demonstrate the dangers of relying solely on the existing
administrative  structures to broaden the range of participation,  disseminate information
more broadly, and increasing  government respc,nsiveness.  As this paper illustrates  social
organizations  have an important role to play in creating effective  government institutions
in Indonesia and in discussions of local governance  more generally.
But this paper also raises a more subtle, troubling, and difficult point.  The
failures of some attempts to deliver technocratically  determined "least cost" or "cost
effective"  solutions to meet what were perceived to be the population's  uniform "needs"
highlighted the importance of local institutions and local variability in conditions.  This
led in turn to the recognition that successful development required more than just
delivering "goods"-it required the social and political conditions out of which the
appropriate collective action could emerge and be supported.  This very useful course
correction leads to more emphasis on individual and community empowerment,  on
meaningful participation in decisions, on the design not just of the development "project"
but the development  "process."  However, people who write papers like this (and think
42about issues in these abstract ways) face a deep paradox-the trap of discovering and
imposing a new universal vision of development on others.  Attempts to intervene in the
reality of complex historical and social processes are fraught with peril - but so is the
alternative.
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45Annex 1: Aggregation and "social capital"
Although this paper emerges  from a literature about "social capital"  (and from a research
project on social capital, and at least in part from  previous research by one of the authors on
social capital (Narayan and Pritchett  1996) we try and avoid the words and instead focus on
directly observable behaviors-e.g.  memberships  and participation  in social relationships of
various types.  Although we do aggregate across types of organizations we do riot create an
aggregate called "social capital"  and a word or two to say why not is in order.
The best way into the problem of creating a meaningful aggregate called social  capital is
to examine the conditions under which one might believe that a linear weighted aggregate of
something called "physical capital" (K) that combined together N different types of objects (e.g.
cars, pumps, buildings, hoes, etc.) which are not measured  in the same units owned by L different
households, firms, and individuals could be meaningful.  So a linear aggregate of physical capital
in a village of L individuals with N possible objects would use weights w:
I.  N
A.l K = IW  .,  *T7'
1=1 n=l
Could it be the case that there is some aggregate,  say profits (H), such that the impact on
profits of an increase in this linear aggregate of items is exactly the same no matter what caused
the aggregate to increase (whether it was trucks or plows)?  In order for this to be true:
A.2  OKl/  a(K)*I(K  J *  aKn,  la8  t/Kn 
Why would this ever be true?  The first order conditions for profit maximization for each
of the I atomistic  producers (that is, competitive in both factor and goods markets) with a
production function for output Q as a function of N capital inputs with prices  Pk,. Pk, are:
Pq *a  K  Pq 4  Q
A.3  X =  K,  =  VK,,  i jI
Pk,  Pk,
That is, the marginal value product (output prices times marginal product per dollar of
capital input should be equalized across all inputs).  Therefore, if one creates a capital aggregate
with prices for each of the capital goods as the weights for each of the I producers then combining
A.2 and A.3:
aKn,,  =  q  =  _  7K,  = (ab  )  Vnri
O~Klaa  Pk,
This is not to persuade that aggregates  of physical capital are reliable.  Rather, it is to
demonstrate that there exist some conditions  in which theoretically  aggregation could be exact
(although perhaps these conditions are empirically  impausible).  I would argue that these
conditions are only rarely met even for the simplest of capital good aggregation problems.  But
the analogous conditions for social capital can never be met.  Lets review briefly put the
46conditions for aggregation of physical "capital"  and show how none of these conditions are, or
can be, met in principle for aggregates of social capital,  in the sense of aggregating from
household characteristics  (which could be either attributes (norms, values, beliefs) or actions
(participation  in social activities, membership  in organizations)).
First, there has to be a single market price for each good faced by all producers over
which the aggregation is being made.  This implies tradability  of the good, which requires
transferability across households  and mobility in space, neither of which is true for household
social characteristics.  The social relationships created through associational  activity are neither
fully transferable across households nor mobile across space (households cannot take it with
them).
Second,  households have to have the same objectivefunction in a common metric, such
as profit maximization.  With social capital people's social behaviors  are determined  by a variety
of considerations, of which household profit maximization  in money units is just one, often not
the most important.
Third, the household objective function and private incentives  have to capture the
aggregate incentives or else private behavior will not lead to conditions  in which aggregation  is
meaningful.  That is, suppose there are network effects  in production  so that one additional
person joining the network raises the productivity of all existing members of the network-then
31 prices, which are based on private decisions, will not provide the right weights  for aggregation
With social capital there is interest  in precisely the benefits to governance  of social relationships
that are created for other reasons (for example,  the impact of religious groups in the spread of
information for facilitating organizing). But if this is so there is no reason to believe that
memberships  in religious organizations will have the same impact on cooperation and socializing
as memberships  in political organizations.  Moreover, with social dynamics and network effects
the social impact of one household  affiliating with an additional  group depends on who already
belongs to that group, as if the household joins a group whose members the household already
has numerous other contacts the increment to "social  connectedness"  might be very small while if
the household  is embedded  with one social group but joins a group that connects them with
another densely connected social group then the addition to social connectedness could be
enormous.  However,  this social benefit may have little or nothing to do with the household's
objective in joining either group.
In this sense any aggregate called "social capital" is prematurely reductionist--in the bad
sense-it presupposes all types of conditions necessary for aggregation  and hence would be
premature in assuming homogeneity in impacts both across types of social  relations and
outcomes.
31 Another example would be of a set of capital  goods which have different pollution properties.
If these costs are external to the household then an aggregate of capital  for predicting aggregate
profits will not be necessarily be a good aggregate  of capital  for predicting pollution.
47Annex 2: Note on reporting  the results ofprobit estimates
A brief note about probit estimation  might clear up some language below.  Probit
estimation  assumes that all that is observed  in a binary indicator (yes/no, on/off, zero/non-zero)
which is arbitrarily assigned the values zero and 1. Mloreover,  it is assumed that the probability
of observing I is a linear function of some underlying index  function(y*)  which itself is a
function of the independent (rhs) variables (x's):
y*=  '* X  + s,  y =1 only if  y* >0.
Where X is a N by K matrix (which includes a constant) and P is a K by I vector.  This
implies that, if we assume the error terms is distributed normally:
Pr ob(y = 1) = Pr ob(f'X + E > 0) = Pr ob(s <  TiX)  = (D(P  X)
Where  D  is the cumulative  normal distribution.  The coefficients of the probit regression
are the P of the index  function.  However,  the marginal effect of an increase  in one of the
independent variables-the  change in the likelihood of observing a "I"  as x changes--is  a non-
linear function of the coefficients and all of the other variables (since the normal distribution is
non-linear).  The expression for the marginal effect of one variable,  xi is:
aProb[y  = 1]  =  5(/6X)  * P
aiC
where +  is the normal frequency distribution.  The impact of xi depends on where it is evaluated.
We will report the impact of each variable  evaluated at the means of all the variables  (including
the variable being evaluated).  Standard errors and tests of significance of the coefficients are
straightforward while the standard errors of the marginal effects depend on where they are
evaluated.  Hence we report marginal effects at the means but the p-levels of the test the
underlying coefficient in the index function is zero.
Ordered  Probit  is a simple extension of probit to multiple categories and thresholds.
Unlike a statistical procedure such as OLS that would assume the dependent variable was a
cardinal  number so that the difference between  0 and  I was the same as the difference  between I
and 2 or between 4 and 5, ordered probit assumes that the levels are ordered (e.g.  2 is higher than
1) but does not assume that the difference  between the categories has any informational  content
(the categories could be 1,2, 3 or 1, 20, 24).
The difficulty with ordered probit is in interpretation  as even if the underling index
function is linear and monotonic this does not mean that an increase  in the independent variable
will be associated with an increased probability  for all "higher" categories.  The algebra is simple
(see Greene (2000)) and the intuition is that if an inctease in an independent  variable  is associated
with "better" then it is unambiguous that the propensity to be in the worst category  is smaller and
the propensity to be in the best larger, but what happens to all categories in the middle is
ambiguous-they could go up or down.
We experimented and the marginal effects from probit combining two of the  categories
were similar.  For instance, with probit the marginal effect on "some participation" for household
membership  in desa government organizations is .067 while the ordered probit marginal effect of
moving from "none" to "some" is .07.
48Annex 3:  Summary of re gression  results
INFORMATION  PARTICIPATION  VOICE  RESPONSIVENESS
HH  informed  HH reports  Some  Some  Someone in  HH reports  a  Expression  Desa gov't  Desa gov't  Desa gov't
of 3 types  all 3 "more  participation  participation  the HH  problem in  effectiveness  responded to  responded to  responded to
(dev't funds,  open"  than  in planning  in determining  involved in  desa and no  -of  those  economic  social  environmental
use of funds,  4 yrs ago  desa projects  sanctions  a "protest"  expression of  who report  problems  problems  problems
program  discontent  there was a
availability)  (positive is  problem with
less voice)  desa
Independent variables  l  leadership
12
HH social  .0099  020  .049  025  .012  .0054  -. 014  .012  .047  -. 005
organizations (private)  (.495)  (.071)'  (.001)***  (01  1)**  (.104)  (.643)  (.763)  (.172)  (.064)*  ( 753)
Desa less HH social  -. 015  .012  -. 007  -. 041  .028  -. 056  .053  .011  -. 057  -. 033
organizations  (.651)  (663)  (.832)  (.088)*  (.127)  (.037)**  (.629)  (.616)  (.423)  (.456)
(community)
HH desa gov't  .041  .029  .067  .031  .0074  -. 026  .159  .012  -. 013  .028
organizations (private)  (.001)***  (.005)***  (.000)***  (.001)***  (.303)  (.013)**  (.000)***  (.145)  (.639)  ( 100)'
Desa less HH desa  -. 085  -.036  -. 066  -. 039  -.045  .094  -. 174  -. 083  -. 040  .134
gov't organizations  (009)***  (.176)  (058)*  (.103)  (021)**  (.000)**'  (.124)  (.001)***  (.623)  (.004)***
(community)  I
HH Networks (private)  .016  .0083  .008  .005  .0017  .0083  -. 033  .003  .025  .002
(.008)***  ( 103)  (228)  (.249)  (629)  (.102)  (.133)  (.452)  (.045)**  (.844)
Desa less HH  .009  -.023  -. 005  .0015  .0032  -. 0004  -. 048  .015  .077  .011
Networks  (community)  (.613)  (.120)  (.779)  (.902)  (.754)  (971)  (.366)  (.283)  (.074)*  (670)
N visits HH  .005  .006  .006  .002  .0046  -. 004  .0079  .002  -. 016  .001
(.166)  (.039)**  (.106)  (.335)  (.032)**  (.103)  (.516)  (.386)  (032)**  (.846)
Other controls  S+  GW+  S+,F-,GW+  S+,F-  Y+,O-,A+  F+,O-,A+  S+,F-,A-  Y+,F-,GW+  A-  S+,A+
l  l  ,A+,GW+  GW+
Regions  Wonogiri(-)  None  Batanghari (-),  Batanghari (-),  Ngada(+)  Banyumas (-),  Banyumas(+),  Batanghari (-),  Banyumas(-),  Batanghari(+),
Banyumas(-),  Banyumas(-),  Wonogiri (-)  Ngada(+)  Ngada(+)  Wonogiri(-)  Ngada(+)
l_________________  |__________  ______  W onogiri(-)  W onogiri(-)
R2 (or equiv)  .057  .058  .192  .172  .131  .052  .0585  .225  .104  .116
N  1171  1171  1171  1171  1171  1171  587  597  314  733
Observed P  .338  .200  .372  185  .122  .186  A--.368  .139  .401  .518
B-.368
___________  __________  __________  ~C--  262  _  _  _  _  _  _
Predicted P  .327  .185  .344  138  .089  .174  A--.403  .076  .388  .523
B--.359
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  ~C  -.236  _  _  _  _  _  _
Estimation technique  Probit  Probit  |  Probit  Probit  Probit  Probit  Ordered probit  Probit  Probit  Probit
Reported  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Coefficients  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal
effects  effects  effects  effects  effects  effects  effects  effects  effects
Notes.  The p-levels of the hypothesis that  the underlying coefficients are zero  are reported in parenthesis (note that these  are not a  test of  the marginal effects, which are non-linear).  P-levels lower
than X percent "reject" the hypothesis the coefficient is zero at that level of statistical significance and the usual level of 10/5/1  are  indicated with one two or three asterisks (/"/**).
Key to control  variables:  Y-consumption expenditures, F-female headed household, S-years of  schooling, GW-HH head works in govemment, A-HH head works in agriculture, 0-age of  HH
head in years.
32 A-if no expression  of discontent; B-if expression  but no solution; C-if  expression  and solution
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